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Proportional Dynamics in Exchange Economies
Simina Braˆnzei∗ Nikhil R. Devanur† Yuval Rabani‡
Abstract
We study the Proportional Response dynamic in exchange economies, where each player
starts with some amount of money and a good. Every day, players bring one unit of their
good and submit bids on goods they like, each good gets allocated in proportion to the
bid amounts, and each seller collects the bids received. Then every player updates the bids
proportionally to the contribution of each good in their utility.
This dynamic models a process of learning how to bid and has been studied in a series of
papers on Fisher and production markets, but not in exchange economies. Our main results
are as follows:
1. For linear utilities, the dynamic converges to market equilibrium utilities and alloca-
tions, while the bids and prices may cycle. We give a combinatorial characterization
of limit cycles for prices and bids.
2. We introduce a lazy version of the dynamic, where players may save money for later,
and show this converges in everything: utilities, allocations, and prices.
3. For CES utilities in the substitute range [0, 1), the dynamic converges for all parame-
ters.
This answers an open question about exchange economies with linear utilities, where
tatonnement does not converge to market equilibria, and no natural process leading to
equilibria was known. We also note that proportional response is a process where the
players exchange goods throughout time (in out-of-equilibrium states), while tatonnement
only explains how exchange happens in the limit.
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To only look at situations where the Invisible Hand has finished its work
cannot lead to a real understanding of how that work is accomplished.
Fisher [Fis83]
1 Introduction
Market dynamics have been an integral part of general equilibrium theory since its inception.
The introduction of general equilibrium theory by Walras [Wal96] was accompanied by the
idea of the taˆtonnement process. Fisher designed in 1891 a device to compute an equilibrium
(Brainard and Scarf [BS05]). The most popular interpretation of taˆtonnement, however, is
as fictitious play. An auctioneer, playing the role of the invisible hand, calls out prices to
which the agents respond with their demand, then the auctioneer adjusts the prices, and the
process repeats until the excess demand is zero. At this point exchange actually happens, at
equilibrium prices. This, however, is not necessarily how actual markets function in practice.
Moreover, general equilibrium theory itself suffers from a lack of a descriptive model of out of
equilibrium exchange: what happens when the excess demand is positive? Further, the causal
linkage between demand and prices is unspecified. Demand is a response to the price as well as
the price is a response to the demand. (See [Fis83] for some disequilibrium extensions; there is
no widely agreed upon model.) The question is fundamentally both algorithmic and economic:
Algorithmically, the question is about an effective and efficient locally controlled network process
that computes an equilibrium. Economically, the question is about an incentives-motivated
multi-agent process that converges to equilibrium.
Shapley and Shubik [SS77] sought to address these issues via the trading post mechanism.
This is first of all a descriptive model that specifies concrete outcomes as a result of player
strategies, and therefore it can be viewed as a non-cooperative game. Prices are a result of
strategic actions; the higher the demand for a good, the higher its price, and vice versa. It
requires that all trade be monetary and that the players pay cash in advance.1 Each player
submits a cash bid on each good. The goods are then distributed in proportion to the bids, and
the per-unit price of a good is set to be the sum of bids on that good (this implies that the
bids of a player should add up to at most the cash at hand). The same mechanism has been
rediscovered multiple times; in particular it has been proposed for sharing resources in computer
networks (e.g. Kelly [Kel97]) and computer systems (e.g. Feldman, Lai, and Zhang [FLZ05]).
This still leaves open the question of dynamics: (how) do players reach a market equilibrium
in the trading post mechanism? The predominant answer to this in the last decade or so
has been the Proportional Response dynamic (see Zhang [Zha11]), where buyers iteratively
update their bid on each good in proportion to the utility they received from that good in the
previous iteration. For the case of linear utilities, this implies that the ratio of bids in successive
iterations is proportional to the bang-per-buck for that good, in contrast to the best response
which distributes all the cash among the goods with the highest bang-per-buck. Such an update
is similar in spirit to the multiplicative weights update algorithms used in online learning (also
to proportional taˆtonnement), except that there are no parameters such as the step size to tune
carefully! It still magically seems to work.
1The assumption is that there is one special commodity used as the means of payment, which is called cash
or money. It may or may not have an intrinsic utility of its own.
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1.1 Our results
This brings us to the topic of this paper, the study of proportional response dynamics in
pure exchange markets. The players are both buyers and sellers, and the exchange at each
step is fueled by the players revenue from the previous round, and a fresh batch of goods
of fixed quantities at the hands of the players. We focus primarily on linear utilities. We
show convergence for the range of CES utilities in the substitutes regime, but the case of
linear utilities is the most difficult to handle. Linear utilities represent a particularly interesting
special case because the process of taˆtonnement is not well defined in markets with such utilities.
Taˆtonnement adjusts the prices based on the excess demand for a good, but with linear utilities
the demand is a set function. Also, the demand is discontinuous: a small change in price can
lead to a large change in demand. This makes taˆtonnement especially unsuited as a process
describing market dynamics for linear utilities. In contrast, linear utilities pose no such problem
for proportional response dynamics. For complements, especially in the extreme case of Leontief
utilities, there is scant hope for fast convergence since computationally the problem of finding
an equilibrium is PPAD-hard (see Codenotti, Saberi, Varadarajan, and Ye [CSVY06]). However
this does not rule out the existence of a slowly converging process.
The dearth of convergence results in this setting is not for the lack of trying (see, e.g.,
gradient descent based algorithms [CLL19]). The difficulty might be attributed to the fact that
the dynamics can cycle! Consider the scenario where there are two sets of players such that
each set buys all its goods from the other set. Suppose that the sets start with widely unequal
amounts of cash. Then in each iteration, the total amount of cash of each set moves to the other
side, forever. However there is still hope: the allocations and the utilities of the players could
converge to those of a market equilibrium, even if the prices oscillate. (In fact, in the above
example the relative prices in each set may converge, even though the price scales alternate
between the sides.)
We study the standard model of exchange economy where each player comes to the market
with a unit endowment of an exclusive good. For linear utilities, this is without loss of generality.
The equilibrium utilities are unique, while the equilibrium allocation may not be. Our main
results are as follows:
1. We show that the kind of cycling described above is essentially the only one possible. We
characterize the limit cycles of the dynamics as follows: there are equivalence classes of
players such that within each class the ratio of price to equilibrium price is a constant.
Further, the classes form a cycle, where the players in each class only buy goods from the
players in the next class in the cycle. The allocations and utilities correspond to a market
equilibrium, and remain invariant all along the limit cycle. (Theorem 5)
2. We show that the allocation and hence the utilities converge (Theorem 4). The result
in the previous item only shows that the limit set in the allocation space is the set of
equilibrium allocations. Convergence to this set is implied.
3. We introduce a lazy version 2 of the proportional response dynamic, where players saves
a certain fraction of their cash at hand for future rounds (Definition 2). The fraction can
be different for each player, as long as it is in (0, 1), but it doesn’t change over time. We
show that for this version, there is no cycling: prices, allocation and utilities all converge
to a market equilibrium (Theorem 3).
2The name is motivated by lazy random walks.
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1.2 Previous work
Most of the results for the convergence of the proportional response dynamics to date have been
for Fisher markets, where the players act just as buyers, and each step is fueled by a fixed income
of each player and a fresh batch of goods. Zhang [Zha11] shows convergence of proportional
response dynamics to the market equilibrium for Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES)
utilities in the substitutes regime. Birnbaum, Devanur, and Xiao [BDX11] interpret proportional
response as mirror descent on the convex program of Shmyrev [Shm09] that captures equilibria
in Fisher markets with linear utilities, and also extends it to some other markets. Cheung, Cole,
and Tao [CCT18] extend the approach in [BDX11] to show that proportional response converges
for the entire range of CES utilities including complements, with linear utilities on one extreme
and Leontief utilities on the other extreme. Cheung, Hoefer, and Nakhe [CHN19] show that
the dynamics stays close to equilibrium even when the market parameters are changing slowly
over time, once again for CES utilities.
Wu and Zhang [WZ07] consider a tit-for-tat dynamic in an exchange setting, which they
also call proportional response, but this is different from what is generally accepted today as
proportional response. In addition, their analysis is for the special case where the value of a
good is the same to each player and there is no money. We show that tit-for-tat and proportional
response are functionally different, i.e. they have different trajectories in terms of allocations
and utilities, even in the special case of utilities analyzed in [WZ07] and given the same starting
configurations (see Appendix 5). In fact, we find an example with arbitrary linear utilities (i.e.
that do not satisfy the special symmetry property under which convergence of tit-for-tat was
known), for which both utilities and allocations in the tit-for-tat dynamics cycle (Appendix 5).
In an exchange setting, Branzei, Mehta, and Nisan [BMN18] generalize the definition of
proportional response from Fisher markets to a production economy ; this is the definition we
use, for the special case of constant amounts. In the production market, players make new goods
from the ones they acquire through the trading post mechanism, and the new goods are sold
in the next iteration. The dynamic leads to universal growth of the market, where the amount
of goods produced grow unboundedly over time, but also to growing inequality between the
players on the most efficient production cycle and the rest. In particular, the dynamic learns
through local interactions a global feature of the exchange graph—the cycle with the highest
geometric mean.
1.3 Difficulties and techniques
The strongest convergence results for proportional response dynamics in Fisher markets are
achieved via the mirror descent interpretation on suitable convex programs [BDX11, CCT18].
Devanur, Garg, and Ve´gh [DGV16] show a similar (but more complicated) convex program for
linear utilities in exchange markets. It is therefore tempting to conjecture that a similar mirror
descent interpretation would extend to exchange markets as well, but unfortunately this doesn’t
seem to be the case. There are many difficulties, but the easiest to explain is the following. In
the Fisher case, the proportional response bids are by definition in the feasible region of the
convex program, which asks that the price of a good equal the total bids placed on it, and that
the budget of a player equal the total of his own bids. In the exchange case, the price of a
good is still the total bid placed on it by definition, but the total bid a player issues equals his
earnings from the previous iteration, which may differ from the total bid placed on its good in
the current iteration. The convex program requires these equality constraints, so the bids don’t
stay inside the feasible region as in the Fisher case.
We use the KL divergence between equilibrium bids and the current bids as a Lyapunov
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function; this divergence was also used in [Zha11] when analyzing Fisher markets. The con-
vergence of utilities is the easiest, and follows almost exactly the analysis for Fisher markets.
Beyond utilities, the cycling of bids presents more difficulties. We characterize the limit cycles
by considering the zero set of a certain set of equations. We argue that their structure is like
that of the price ratios in the limit cycles described above. The convergence of allocation fol-
lows from showing that the KL divergence between the (equilibrium and current) bids can be
decomposed into a positive linear combination of the KL divergence between the prices and the
KL divergences between the allocations for each good. This also implies that the KL divergence
between equilibrium prices and prices on a limit cycle must be an invariant.
For the lazy version we show that adding a suitably weighted KL divergence between equlib-
rium prices and current budgets to the Lyapunov function does the trick. It collapses the limit
cycles so that the limit set is now just the equilibria. This then gives us that the Lyapunov
function must go to zero, which implies convergence of prices as well.
1.4 Other related work
The study of convergence of taˆtonnement goes back at least as far as Arrow, Block, and
Hurwicz [ABH59], which was soon followed by examples of cycling (see Scarf [Sca60] and
Gale [Gal63]). For markets with weak gross substitutes utilities (WGS), a polynomial time
convergence of a discrete time process was shown by Codenotti, McCune, and Varadara-
jan [CMV05], and Cole and Fleischer [CF08] showed fast convergence not just for static markets,
but also “ongoing” markets. (See also Fleischer, Garg, Kapoor, Khandekar, and Saberi [FGK+08].)
This was followed up by similar analysis for some markets with complementarities (Cheung,
Cole, and Rastogi [CCR12]; Cheung and Cole [CC14]; Avigdor, Rabani, and Yadgar [AERY14]),
then for all “Eisenberg-Gale” markets in the Fisher model [CCD19]. Some of these analyses
apply to ongoing and/or asynchronous settings.
Several approaches have been explored for the (centralized) computation of equilibria in a lin-
ear exchange market: the ellipsoid method (Jain [Jai07]; Codenotti, Pemmaraju, and Varadara-
jan [CPV05]), interior point algorithms (Ye [Ye08]), combinatorial flow based methods (Jain,
Mahdian, and Saberi [JMS03]; Devanur and Vazirani [DV03]; Duan and Mehlhorn [DM15];
Duan, Garg, and Mehlhorn [DGM16]). Extending the Fisher market version of [DPSV08]) re-
cently led to a strongly polynomial time algorithm (Garg and Ve´gh [GV19]). Other approaches
include auction based algorithms [GK06, BGH19], cell decomposition [DPS03, DK08], comple-
mentary pivoting [GMSV15], and computational versions of Sperner’s lemma [EW11, Sca77].
On the other hand, computing an equilibrium with even the simplest kind of complementarities
is PPAD-hard [CSVY06, CDDT09].
There has been extensive work on understanding dynamics in games and auction settings
under various behavioural models of the agents, such as best-response dynamics, multiplicative
weight updates, fictitious play (e.g., [FS99, KPT09, DDK15, MPP15, PP16a, RST17, DS16,
HKMN11, PP16b, LST16]) and best response processes and other dynamics of learning how to
bid in market settings [CD11, NSVZ11, BR11, LB10, BBN17, DK17, CDE+14, BFR19]). In
the former the focus has been on convergence to an equilibrium, preferable Nash, and if not
then (coarse) correlated equilibria, and the rate of covergence. In the latter the focus has been
on either convergence points and their quality (price-of-anarchy), or dynamic mechanisms such
as ascending price auctions to reach efficient allocations (e.g. the Ausubel auction [Aus04]).
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1.5 Organization of the paper
In Section 2, we give the definitions of the two variants of the proportional response dynamics,
and market equilibria and state some useful properties. We also show numeric examples of
cycling for the non-lazy version. Section 3 defines a Lyapunov function for the dynamic, which
shows convergence of utilities. We also show convergence of allocation and prices for the strictly
lazy version. In Section 4, we characterize limit cycles, and show convergence of allocation for
the non-lazy version. Section 5 shows a comparison with the tit-for-tat dynamic, including an
example where tit-for-tat cycles. The deferred proofs are in Appendix A.
2 Preliminaries
There are n agents, each of which has one unit of an eponymous good. The goods are divisible.
The agents have linear utilities given by a matrix A = {ai,j}, where ai,j > 0 is the valuation of
agent i for one unit of the good owned by agent j. We assume that every agent has a certain
quantity of a numeraire to start with, which we call money. All the prices will be determined
in terms of this numeraire. The agents don’t have any utility for the money; it just facilitates
exchange of goods.
Proportional Response in Exchange Economies: The proportional response dynamic
describes a process in which the players come to the market every day with one unit of good
and some budget, which is split into bids. The players bid on the goods, then the seller of each
good allocates it in proportion to the bid amounts and collects the money from selling, which
becomes its budget in the next round. Finally the players update their bids in proportion to
the contribution of each good to their utility.
Definition 1 (Proportional Response Dynamic). The initial bids of player i are bi,j(0), which
are non-zero whenever ai,j > 0. Then, at each time t, the following steps occur:
Exchange of goods. Each player i brings one unit of its good and submits bids bi,j(t).
The player receives an amount xi,j(t) of each good j, where
xi,j(t) =
{
bi,j(t)∑n
k=1 bk,j(t)
, if bi,j(t) > 0
0, otherwise
Utility. Each player i computes the utility for its bundle: ui(t) =
∑n
j=1 ai,j · xi,j(t) .
Bid update. Each player i collects the money made from selling: Bi(t+1) =
∑n
k=1 bk,i(t)
and updates his bids proportionally to the contribution of each good in his utility:
bi,j(t+ 1) =
(
ai,j ·xi,j(t)
ui(t)
)
·Bi(t+ 1)
Note: The sum of bids on a good can be seen as its price, so we will write pi(t) =
∑n
k=1 bk,i(t) .
Figure 1 shows an example trajectory in a ten player economy. In this example it can be seen
that the allocations and utilities converge while the prices continue cycling even after several
hundred rounds.
5
(a) Allocations xi,j(t) over time. (b) Utilities ui(t) over time.
(c) Prices pi(t) over time.
Figure 1: Proportional response dynamic in an economy with n = 10 players for three com-
ponents over T = 500 rounds: allocations, utilities, and prices. The graph consists of three
components (C1, C2, C3), where C4 := C1, so that players in Ci only consume goods from Ci+1
and C1 = {1, 2, 3}, C2 = {4, 5, 6, 7}, and C3 = {8, 9, 10}.
Lazy Proportional Response in Exchange Economies: Our first contribution is to define
a more general framework for proportional response, which can be seen as a lazy version of the
dynamic and where each player spends only some fraction αi ∈ (0, 1] of its total money in each
round, while keeping the remaining fraction of 1−αi in the bank. Then in the next round, the
player collects the money it made from selling and takes out the money from the bank, which
sum up to its total amount of money. Then again the player spends a fraction αi of its total
money, while saving the remainder of 1− αi in the bank.
Formally, we have the following definition.
Definition 2 (Lazy Proportional Response Dynamic). Initially each player i has some amount
of money mi(0). The player splits a fraction αi ∈ (0, 1] of the money into initial bids bi,j(0),
which are non-zero whenever ai,j > 0. I.e., the budget for spending at time 0, which is Bi(0) ,
αi ·mi(0), is split into bids bi,j(0) satisfying
∑
j bi,j(0) = αi ·mi(0), and the player saves the
remaining portion of money (1 − αi) · mi(0) in the bank. At each time t, the next steps take
place:
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Exchange of goods. Each player i brings one unit of its good and submits bids bi,j(t).
The player receives an amount xi,j(t) of each good j, where
xi,j(t) =
{
bi,j(t)∑n
k=1 bk,j(t)
, if bi,j(t) > 0
0, otherwise
Utility. Each player i computes the utility for its bundle: ui(t) =
∑n
j=1 ai,j · xi,j(t).
Bid update. Each player i collects the money made from selling: pi(t) =
∑n
k=1 bk,i(t).
Now the total money of player i is the price of the good sold and the money saved: mi(t) =
pi(t) + (1− αi)Bi(t)/αi. This gets split again into a fraction of (1− αi) that is saved in the
bank and a fraction αi that becomes the budget for spending in the next round:
Bi(t+ 1) = αi ·mi(t+ 1) = αi · pi(t) + (1− αi)Bi(t).
The player updates his bids proportionally to the contribution of each good in his utility:
bi,j(t+ 1) =
(
ai,j ·xi,j(t)
ui(t)
)
·Bi(t+ 1)
Notice that the special case of this dynamic where αi = 1 for all agents i is simply the
proportional response dynamic of Definition 1.
(a) Allocations xi,j(t) over time. (b) Utilities ui(t) over time.
(c) Prices pi(t) over time.
Figure 2: Lazy version of the dynamic where the players have the same valuations and initial
budgets and bids as in Figure 1, but they also have a matching amount saved in the bank, and
in each round they save 50% of their money.
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In Figure 2 we show the dynamic for the same valuations and initial bids as in Figure 1 but
where the players also have half of their money in the bank at each time unit.
2.1 Market Equilibria
We review the definition of market equilibria and some useful properties. We assume that for
each good j there is at least one player i such that ai,j > 0. An equilibrium is given by a set of
prices pi for each i ∈ [n] and a set of allocations xi,j ≥ 0 for each pair i, j ∈ [n] such that
Market clearing: the goods are all sold, i.e., ∀ j,∑i xi,j = 1.
Optimal allocation: each buyer gets an optimal bundle of goods, i.e., ∀ i, xi,js maximize the
sum
∑
j ai,jxi,j subject to the budget constraint
∑
j pjxi,j ≤ pi.
It is known that equilibrium utilities are unique. Equilibrium allocations and prices may
not be unique, but equilibrium allocations, equilibrium prices, the set of equilibria (xi,j , log pj),
and the set of equilibria (bi,j , pj) where bi,j = xi,jpj , all form convex sets [Gal76, Cor89, Mer03,
Flo04, DGV16].
We note the following condition, which is guarateed to hold at any equilibrium in an exchange
market (∗s indicate equilibrium quantities):
u∗i
p∗i
=
ai,j
p∗j
, for all i, j s.t. x∗i,j > 0 (1)
Fisher Markets: A variant of this model is the Fisher market, where there is a distinction
between buyers and sellers. There are n players and n goods, and the utilities are as before. In
addition, each player i comes to the market with a fixed budget Bi. The equilibrium conditions
are the same as before, except that the budget constraint of player i is that
∑
j pjxi,j ≤ Bi.
The following convex program, called the Eisenberg-Gale convex program, captures equilibria
in the Fisher market (with linear utilities): the set of optimal solutions to this program is equal
to the set of equilibrium allocations and utilities [EG59].
max
∑
i∈[n]Bi · log(ui) s.t.
∀ i ∈ [n], ui ≤
∑
j ai,jxi,j ,
∀ j ∈ [n], ∑i xi,j ≤ 1,
∀ i, j ∈ [n], xi,j ≥ 0.
Moreover, equilibrium utilities and prices are unique in the Fisher market [EG59].
We conclude this section by noting that the fixed points of the lazy proportional response
dynamics are market equilibria.
Proposition 1. Suppose αi ∈ (0, 1] for each player i. Then any fixed point of lazy proportional
response is a market equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose ~b∗ is a fixed point of the proportional dynamic; let x∗i,j be the resulting fixed
point allocation and u∗i the corresponding utilities. For each good j, let p
∗
j =
∑n
i=1 b
∗
i,j ; this
quantity can be interpreted as the price of the good at the fixed point. The budget update rule
at the fixed point gives:
B∗i = αi · p∗i + (1− αi)B∗i ⇐⇒ B∗i = p∗i .
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Using the fact that B∗i = p
∗
i we can write the bid update rule as:
b∗i,j =
(
ai,j · x∗i,j
u∗i
)
·B∗i =
ai,j ·
(
b∗i,j∑n
k=1 b
∗
k,j
)
u∗i
 ·B∗i =
ai,j · b
∗
i,j
p∗j
u∗i
 · p∗i
If b∗i,j = 0 the identity trivially holds. For b
∗
i,j > 0, the identity is equivalent to u
∗
i /pi = ai,j/pj .
This condition is the same as the market equilibrium condition for all strictly positive bids in
the exchange economy, and so every fixed point is a market equilibrium.
2.2 Additional Examples
Figure 3 shows a two player economy under the non-lazy proportional response dynamic, where
the bids of the players cycle in the limit. This economy has the property that the valuation
matrix has all entries non-zero, but the consumption graph market equilibrium is bipartite. For
some initial bids, this structure leads to cycling of the pricing.
(a) Allocations xi,j(t) over time. (b) Utilities ui(t) over time.
(c) Prices pi(t) over time.
Figure 3: Proportional response dynamic in an economy with n = 2 players over T = 100 rounds:
allocations, utilities, and prices. Player 1 is shown in black and player 2 in red. The initial
valuation matrix is non-zero everywhere: A = [[38.0, 51.0], [79.0, 75.0]] and the initial bids are
bi,j = 1/2 for all i, j. The market equilibrium allocation is x1,2 = x2,1 = 1 and x1,1 = x2,2 = 0.
The prices are cycling in the limit.
The next figure shows an example with n = 12 players, with and without savings. In this
case, both versions of the dynamic converge, but the non-lazy version converges more slowly.
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(a) Allocations xi,j(t) over time with αi = 0 for all i. (b) Allocations xi,j(t) over time with αi = 1/2 for all i.
(c) Utilities ui(t) over time with αi = 0 for all i. (d) Utilities ui(t) over time with αi = 1/2 for all i.
(e) Bids bi,j(t) over time with αi = 0 for all i. (f) Bids bi,j(t) over time with αi = 1/2 for all i.
Figure 4: Proportional response dynamic in an economy with n = 12 players over T = 380
rounds: allocations, utilities, and bids. The non-lazy dynamic is shown on the left, while the
lazy one with αi = 1/2 for each player i is on the right, for the same valuations and initial bids,
but where each player starts with a saving in the bank that matches its budget.
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3 Convergence of lazy proportional response
In this section we study the dynamic and show convergence of utilities for any combination of
the values αi ∈ (0, 1].
3.1 Convergence of Utilities
In this section we show that the utilities of the players converge for any valuations, initial
configuration of the bids bi,j(0), and savings fractions αi ∈ (0, 1] of the players. We let u∗i
denote the (unique) equilibrium utilities.
Theorem 1. For any initial non-degenerate bids, the utilities of the players in the lazy dynamic
converge to the market equilibrium utilities u∗i ; that is, limt→∞ ui(t) = u
∗
i .
The high level idea is to show that a Lyapunov function for the dynamics is the Kullback-
Leibler (KL) divergence between the vector with the bids and prices at a market equilibrium,
and bids and budgets for the dynamic. We let p∗i and x
∗
i,j denote some equilibrium price and
allocation resp., and let b∗i,j = p
∗
j · x∗i,j . For each i, j ∈ N , define
zi,j(t) =

(
b∗i,j
bi,j(t)
)b∗i,j
if b∗i,j > 0, bi,j(t) > 0
1 otherwise
(2)
and
wi(t) =

(
p∗i
Bi(t)
)p∗i ·( 1−αiαi ) if p∗i > 0, Bi(t) > 0
1 otherwise
(3)
Then our Lyapunov function is f(t) =
∏
i,j∈[n] zi,j(t) ·
∏
i∈[n]wi(t). Assume w.l.o.g. that the
sum of all the budgets is 1. Similarly we normalize p∗i so that they sum up to 1. With this, we
get that
log f(t) = dKL(b
∗
i,j || bi,j(t)) +
(
1−αi
αi
)
· dKL(p∗i || Bi(t)).
The key fact we use about f(t) is an iterative formula relating f(t+ 1) to f(t). We first define
the functions h, g : N→ R by
g(t) =
∏
i:p∗i>0
(
ui(t)
u∗i
)p∗i
and
h(t) =
∏
i∈[n]
pi(t) ·Bi(t)
(
1−αi
αi
)
(
αi · pi(t) + (1− αi) ·Bi(t)
) 1
αi

p∗i
.
Then we have the following lemma.
Lemma 1. With the lazy proportional response dynamics, we have the identity:
f(t+ 1) = f(t) · g(t) · h(t).
Proof. The bid update rule gives
bi,j(t+ 1) =
(
ai,j · xi,j(t)
ui(t)
)
·Bi(t+ 1) = ai,j
ui(t)
· bi,j(t)
pj(t)
·Bi(t+ 1)
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Expanding zi,j(t+ 1), we obtain
zi,j(t+ 1) =
 b∗i,j(
ai,j ·xi,j(t)
ui(t)
)
·Bi(t+ 1)
b∗i,j
=
(
b∗i,j
bi,j(t)
· ui(t)
ai,j
· pj(t)
Bi(t+ 1)
)b∗i,j
= zi,j(t) ·
(
ui(t)
ai,j
· pj(t)
Bi(t+ 1)
)b∗i,j
(4)
Using the equilibrium property (1) of the exchange economy and identity (4) gives
zi,j(t+ 1) =
zi,j(t) ·
(
ui(t)
u∗i
· pj(t)p∗j ·
p∗i
Bi(t+1)
)b∗i,j
if b∗i,j > 0
0 otherwise
Expanding wi(t+ 1) gives
wi(t+ 1) =
(
p∗i
Bi(t+ 1)
)p∗i ·( 1−αiαi )
=
(
p∗i
Bi(t)
)p∗i ·( 1−αiαi ) · ( Bi(t)
Bi(t+ 1)
)p∗i ·( 1−αiαi )
Expanding f(t+ 1) yields
f(t+ 1) =
∏
i,j∈[n]
zi,j(t+ 1) ·
∏
i∈[n]
wi(t+ 1)
=
∏
i,j∈N :b∗i,j>0
zi,j(t) ·
(
ui(t)
u∗i
· pj(t)
p∗j
· p
∗
i
Bi(t+ 1)
)b∗i,j
·
∏
i∈[n]
(
p∗i
Bi(t)
)p∗i ·( 1−αiαi ) · ( Bi(t)
Bi(t+ 1)
)p∗i ·( 1−αiαi )
= f(t) ·
 ∏
i,j∈N :b∗i,j>0
(
ui(t)
u∗i
· pj(t)
p∗j
· p
∗
i
Bi(t+ 1)
)b∗i,j · ∏
i∈[n]
(
Bi(t)
Bi(t+ 1)
)p∗i ·( 1−αiαi )
Separating the utility terms from the price terms gives
f(t+ 1) = f(t) ·
∏
i:p∗i>0
(
ui(t)
u∗i
)∑
j b
∗
i,j ∏
i:p∗i>0
(
p∗i
Bi(t+ 1)
)∑
j b
∗
i,j ∏
j:p∗j>0
(
pj(t)
p∗j
)∑
i b
∗
i,j ∏
i∈[n]
(
Bi(t)
Bi(t+ 1)
)p∗i ·( 1−αiαi )
= f(t) ·
∏
i:p∗i>0
(
ui(t)
u∗i
)p∗i
·
∏
i:p∗i>0
(
p∗i
Bi(t+ 1)
)p∗i
·
∏
j:p∗j>0
(
pj(t)
p∗j
)p∗j
·
∏
i∈[n]
(
Bi(t)
Bi(t+ 1)
)p∗i ·( 1−αiαi )
Note the condition on i that there exists j for which b∗i,j > 0 is equivalent to p
∗
i > 0, which at
the market equilibrium is met for every index i ∈ [n]. Similarly, the condition on j that there
exists i such that b∗i,j > 0 is equivalent to p
∗
j > 0. Then we can rewrite f(t+ 1) as follows:
f(t+ 1) = f(t) ·
∏
i∈[n]
(
ui(t)
u∗i
)p∗i
·
∏
i∈[n]
(
p∗i
Bi(t+ 1)
)p∗i
·
∏
j∈[n]
(
pj(t)
p∗j
)p∗j ∏
i∈[n]
(
Bi(t)
Bi(t+ 1)
)p∗i ·( 1−αiαi )
= f(t) ·
∏
i∈[n]
(
ui(t)
u∗i
)p∗i
·
∏
i∈[n]
(
pi(t)
Bi(t+ 1)
)p∗i ∏
i∈[n]
(
Bi(t)
Bi(t+ 1)
)p∗i ·( 1−αiαi )
(5)
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We also analyze the term
∏
i∈[n]
(
pi(t)
Bi(t+ 1)
)
·
∏
i∈[n]
(
Bi(t)
Bi(t+ 1)
) 1−αi
αi
=
∏
i∈[n]
pi(t) ·Bi(t)
(
1−αi
αi
)
Bi(t+ 1)
1
αi
=
∏
i∈[n]
pi(t) ·Bi(t)
(
1−αi
αi
)
(
αi · pi(t) + (1− αi) ·Bi(t)
) 1
αi
(6)
= h(t)
1
p∗i . (7)
Recall that g(t) =
∏
i:p∗i>0
(
ui(t)
u∗i
)p∗i
. Then we get f(t+ 1) = f(t) · g(t) · h(t) as required.
We now show convergence of utilities.
Proof of Theorem 1. Observe that log g(t) =
∑
i∈N p
∗
i · log
(
ui(t)
u∗i
)
. Consider the Fisher market
obtained by setting the budget of each player to the equilibrium price of its own good. Then the
expression
∑
i∈N p
∗
i · log ui, which is the Eisenberg-Gale objective, is maximized by u∗i . It follows
that
∑
i∈N p
∗
i · log ui(t) <
∑
i∈N p
∗
i · log u∗i whenever the utilities are different, i.e. ui(t) 6= u∗i for
some player i. Thus g(t) ≤ 1 for all t, and the equality holds if and only if ui(t) = u∗i for all i.
Using the weighted arithmetic mean-geometric mean inequality, we have that
pi(t)
αi ·Bi(t)1−αi ≤ αi · pi(t) + (1− αi) ·Bi(t)
for all αi ∈ (0, 1]. Thus h(t) ≤ 1 for all t.
Since g(t) < 1 and h(t) ≤ 1, we obtain that f(t + 1) < f(t) for all the times t where the
utilities are not the equilibrium utilities. It follows that f(t) is monotonically decreasing and
bounded from below, so limt→∞ f(t) exists and is non-zero. Taking the limit of t → ∞ in the
expression f(t+ 1) = f(t) · g(t) · h(t), we get that limt→∞ g(t) = 1, and so the dynamic reaches
the market equilibrium utilities.
3.2 Convergence of Bids and Allocations in the Lazy Dynamic
In this subsection, we focus on the case when αi < 1 for all i. In this case, the limit points of
the sequence must correspond to equilibrium prices.
Theorem 2. If each αi < 1, then any limit point of the sequence bi,j(t) is an equilibrium.
Proof. Let ~b be a limit point with a converging subsequence s = (s1, s2, . . .). As before, the
utilities converge to the equilibrium utility. Further, we have that limn→∞h(sn) = 1, which
implies limn→∞Bi(sn) = limn→∞pi(sn) for all i. Thus for the limit point we must have that
∀ i,∑j bi,j = pi. It is now easy to verify that the allocations and prices satisfy the equilibrium
conditions.
With this in hand, we can now show that the equilibrium bids and allocations converge.
Note that this automatically implies that the prices converge too.
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Theorem 3. If each αi < 1, then the bids and allocations of the lazy dynamic converge to a
market equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose towards a contradiction that there exists a starting configuration bi,j(0) for
which the sequence of bids does not converge. Then since the set of feasible bid matrices is
compact, there exist two subsequences of rounds s′ = (s′1, s′2, . . .) and s′′ = (s′′1, s′′2, . . .) so that
the bids converge to two limit bid matrices ~b′ and ~b′′ along these subsequences, respectively.
From Theorem 2 we have that both ~b′ and ~b′′ are market equilibrium bids. Define the
function f with respect to the limit bids ~b′ (i.e. set ~b∗ = ~b′ in the definition of f). Then we
have that log f(~b′) = 0 and log f(~b) > 0 for all ~b 6= ~b′. Let ~p′ and ~p′′ be the price vectors
corresponding to bids ~b′ and ~b′′. Since the bids along the sequences s′ and s′′ converge to
different limits, by continuity of the KL divergence there exist δ > 0 and an index k0 ∈ N so
that | log f(~b(s′k))− log f(~b(s′′k))| > δ for all k ≥ k0. This implies that limk→∞ log f(~b(s′′k)) > 0,
which is a contradiction. Thus the subsequence s′′ cannot exist and the bids converge in the
limit as required.
4 Cycling behavior and convergence of allocations in the non-
lazy dynamic
Note the bids may in fact cycle in proportional response (the strictly non-lazy version), thus
we do not necessarily obtain in the limit the market equilibrium prices. Consider the following
economy.
Example 1 (Bid cycling). Let N = {1, 2}, with utilities a1,1 = a2,2 = 0, a1,2 = a2,1 = 1 and
initial bids b1,1(0) = b2,2(0) = 0, b1,2(0) = 1/3, b2,1(0) = 2/3. Then at the market equilibrium
the prices of the two goods are equal, so p∗1 = p∗2 = 1/2, with b∗1,2 = b∗2,1 = 1/2. Thus we have
f(0) =
(
1/2
1/3
)1/2 · (1/22/3)1/2. Since the players swap their budgets throughout the dynamic, we
get that f(2k + 1) =
(
1/2
2/3
)1/2 · (1/21/3)1/2 = f(2k) = f(0) for all k ∈ N.
More generally, prices do not converge in bipartite graphs when the two sides are unbalanced.
For example, consider any economy where the underlying graph is bipartite. Suppose the initial
sums of the budgets on the two sides of the graph are different. Then the prices do not converge.
This follows from the fact that the two sides will keep swapping their money each iterartion.
This phenomenon is analogous to what happens with periodic Markov chains. We note
that cycling can happen even if the valuation matrix has all the edges non-zero and the bids are
strictly positive. Rather, what determines cycling are the consumption graph in the equilibrium
allocation together with the initial distribution of bids.
We first show that the allocation always converges and later characterize the instances where
the bids cycle.
Theorem 4. The allocation in the (non-lazy) proportional response dynamic converges to a
market equilibrium allocation.
Proof. For any initial bids bi,j(0), there is a subsequence of bids converging to some limit ~b
′. We
note that the limit~b′ may not be market equilibrium bids. However, the allocation corresponding
to ~b′ must give equilibrium utilities, by Theorem 1. Any such allocation is also an equilibrium.
(We are not sure if this property is known before; we could not find any reference. We give a
proof this in Appendix A, as Theorem 6.) Let this allocation be ~x′ = ~x∗, the corresponding
equilibrium price be ~p∗ and the corresponding bids be ~b∗.
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Let ~p′ be the prices induced by the bids ~b′. Since the allocation under the two bid profiles
is the same, we get
b′i,j
b∗i,j
=
(
b′i,j
p′j
)
(
b∗i,j
p∗j
) · p′j
p∗j
=
x′i,j
x∗i,j
· p
′
j
p∗j
=
p′j
p∗j
Let j ∈ [n] be arbitrary but fixed. Then we obtain
∑
i∈[n]
b∗i,j · log
b′i,j
b∗i,j
=
∑
i∈[n]
b∗i,j · log
p′j
p∗j
= p∗j · log
p′j
p∗j
(8)
Suppose for the sake of contradiction that the sequence of allocations of the dynamic does not
converge. Then there exists another subsequence of bids converging to a different limit ~b′′ 6= ~b′
which has the property that ~x′′ 6= ~x′, where ~x′′ is the allocation at the bid profile ~b′′. We use
an identity which we state in Lemma 2 to obtain
∑
i∈[n]
b∗i,j · log
b′′i,j
b∗i,j
= p∗j · log
p′′j
p∗j
+ p∗j ·
∑
i∈[n]
x′i,j · log
x′′i,j
x′i,j
.
From Theorem 1, the KL divergence between the fixed point bids ~b∗ and the dynamic bids
~b(t) is decreasing and converges to some constant α ≥ 0. Since both ~b′,~b′′ are limit points of
~b(t), this implies that
∑
j∈[n]
∑
i∈[n]
b∗i,j · log
b′i,j
b∗i,j
=
∑
j∈[n]
∑
i∈[n]
b∗i,j · log
b′′i,j
b∗i,j
⇐⇒
∑
j∈[n]
p∗j · log
p′j
p∗j
=
∑
j∈[n]
p∗j · log
p′′j
p∗j
+
∑
j∈[n]
p∗j ·
∑
i∈[n]
x′i,j · log
x′′i,j
x′i,j
(9)
Among all possible choices of limit bid profiles ~b′ and market equilibrium bids ~b∗ with the
same allocation, select the pair (~b′, ~b∗) that minimizes the sum
∑
j∈[n] p
∗
j · log
p′j
p∗j
; this is possible
since the bid space is compact so the infimum of a set of accummulation points is itself an
accummulation point (See Lemma 4.1 in [Kha02] for example). For this choice of bids, we
obtain ∑
j∈[n]
p∗j · log
p′′j
p∗j
≥
∑
j∈[n]
p∗j · log
p′j
p∗j
=
∑
j∈[n]
p∗j · log
p′′j
p∗j
+
∑
j∈[n]
p∗j ·
∑
i∈[n]
x′i,j · log
x′′i,j
x′i,j
(10)
Note that each term
∑
i∈[n] x
′
i,j · log
x′′i,j
xi,j′
represents the KL-divergence between the allocation
of good i at the limits x′ and x′′. Since the KL divergence is always non-negative, we get that
in fact
∑
i∈[n] x
′
i,j · log
x′′i,j
x′i,j
= 0 for each j, so the allocation at the limit ~b′′ is the same as at ~b′.
Thus the assumption that the limit ~b′′ had a different allocation from ~b′ was incorrect, so the
allocations must converge.
Lemma 2. For any two bids ~b and ~b′ and corresponding allocations and prices, we have that
∑
i∈[n]
bi,j · log
b′i,j
bi,j
= pj · log
p′j
pj
+ pj ·
∑
i∈[n]
xi,j · log
x′i,j
xi,j
.
15
Proof.
∑
i∈[n]
bi,j · log
b′i,j
bi,j
=
∑
i∈[n]
bi,j · log
x′i,j · p′j
xi,j · pj
=
∑
i∈[n]
bi,j · log
p′j
pj
+
∑
i∈[n]
bi,j · log
x′i,j
xi,j
= pj · log
p′j
pj
+
∑
i∈[n]
pj · xi,j · log
x′i,j
xi,j
= pj · log
p′j
pj
+ pj ·
∑
i∈[n]
xi,j · log
x′i,j
xi,j
(11)
We now characterize the limit cycles in the price space. Note that we already have from
Theorem 4 that the allocation must remain an invariant along any limit cycle.
Theorem 5. The limit bids of the proportional response dynamic are either an equilibrium
or there exist equivalence classes C1, . . . , Ck, where Ci ∩ Cj = ∅, Ci ⊆ N for all i, such that
there exists λi(t) ≥ 0 for each Ci with the property that the price of each good j ∈ Ci satisfies
pj(t)/p
∗
j = λi(t), for some equilibrium price ~p
∗.
Proof. We have from Theorem 4 that the allocation converges to an equilibrium; let ~p∗ be the
corresponding equilibrium price, and ~u∗ the equilibrium utilities. Consider a limit point, and
consider taking one step of the dynamics from the limit point. We denote the limit point by
~b(t), just to indicate that the next step after this is ~b(t + 1). The point ~b(t + 1) is also a limit
point of the sequence.3 By the definition of the update rule, we have that
ui(t+ 1) =
n∑
j=1
ai,j · xi,j(t+ 1) =
n∑
j=1
ai,j · bi,j(t+ 1)∑n
k=1 bk,j(t+ 1)
By Theorem 1, the utilities converge in the limit to the market equilibrium utilities, therefore
3This is a well known property of continuous time dynamical systems, and the same holds for discrete time
systems as well. A quick proof: if sn is the subsequence whose limit is ~b(t), then by continuity of the update
rule, we get that the subsequence sn + 1 must have ~b(t+ 1) as its limit.
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we have that ui(t) = u
∗
i = ui(t+ 1) for all i ∈ [n]. Then we get
ui(t+ 1) =
n∑
j=1
ai,j · bi,j(t+ 1)∑n
k=1 bk,j(t+ 1)
=
n∑
j=1
ai,j ·
ai,j
u∗i
· xi,j(t) ·Bi(t+ 1)∑n
k=1
ak,j
u∗k
· xk,j(t) ·Bk(t+ 1)
=
n∑
j=1
ai,j ·
p∗j
p∗i
· xi,j(t) ·Bi(t+ 1)∑n
k=1
p∗j
p∗k
· xk,j(t) ·Bk(t+ 1)
=
n∑
j=1
ai,j
p∗i
· xi,j(t) ·Bi(t+ 1)∑n
k=1 xk,j(t) · Bk(t+1)p∗k
=
n∑
j=1
ai,j · xi,j(t) ·
(
pi(t)
p∗i
)
∑n
k=1 xk,j(t) ·
(
pk(t)
p∗k
) = ui(t) = n∑
j=1
ai,j · xi,j(t) (12)
The third equality follows from (1). Let λi(t) = pi(t)/p
∗
i . Then identity (12) is equivalent
to the following system of equations, where ai,j , xi,j(t) are given and λi(t) are variables:{
λi(t) ≥ 0, for all i ∈ [n]∑n
j=1 ai,j · xi,j(t) ·
(
λi(t)∑n
k=1 xk,j(t)·λk(t) − 1
)
= 0, for all i ∈ [n]
One solution can be obtained as follows. Define the equivalence relation ∼ as follows: i ∼ k
if and only if there exists j ∈ [n] such that xi,j , xk,j > 0. Then consider the transitive closure
of this graph – that is, if player i purchases some other good ` 6= j, then all the players that
purchase strictly positive amounts of good ` are in the same equivalence class with i and k. Let
C1, . . . , Ck be equivalence classes with respect to the ∼ relation. Then setting λi(t) = λk(t)
for each i ∼ k works. This means that all the goods in the same equivalence class have prices
within the same factor away from the market equilibrium price at any point in time.
We show that in fact these are the only solutions. Consider an arbitrary solution to this
system and suppose towards a contradiction that there exist two players i, i′ in the same equiv-
alence class C` but with λi(t) > λi′(t). W.l.o.g., λi(t) = maxv∈C` λv(t). Then for all j with
xi,j(t) > 0 we have
λi(t)∑n
k=1 xk,j(t) · λk(t)
> 1 ⇐⇒ ai,j · xi,j(t) ·
(
λi(t)∑n
k=1 xk,j(t) · λk(t)
− 1
)
> 0 (13)
Summing up inequality (13) over all j we get
n∑
j=1
ai,j · xi,j(t) ·
(
λi(t)∑n
k=1 xk,j(t) · λk(t)
− 1
)
> 0,
which does not satisfy the required system of identities. Thus the assumption must have been
false and λi(t) = λi′(t) for any players i, i
′ in the same equivalence class.
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5 Comparison between Tit-for-Tat and Proportional Response
In this section we compare proportional response with the tit-for-tat dynamic given the same
starting configuration. The two dynamics have different trajectories, even in the special case
where there exists a vector ~w = (w1, . . . , wn) so that ai,j = wj for each player i and each good
j, which is the special case where Wu and Zhang [WZ07] established convergence to market
equilibria for the tit-for-tat dynamic.
Recall that for general valuations A = (ai,j), the tit-for-tat dynamic is
yi,j(t+ 1) =
yj,i(t)·ai,j
ui(t)
where yj,i(t) is the fraction received by player i from good j in round t and the utility of player
i in round t is ui(t) =
∑n
k=1 yk,i(t) ·ai,k. (The order of the subscripts here is good, player, which
is the convention used in [WZ07], as opposed to our notation where the order is player, good.)
(a) Allocations under tit-for-tat. (b) Allocations under non-lazy pro-
portional response.
(c) Allocations under lazy propor-
tional response with all αi = 1/2.
(d) Utilities under tit-for-tat. (e) Utilities under non-lazy propor-
tional response.
(f) Utilities under lazy proportional
response with all αi = 1/2.
Figure 5: Comparison between tit-for-tat, non-lazy proportional response, and lazy propor-
tional response, initialized with the same initial fractions of splitting the goods. The valuation
matrix is ~a = [[1, 2], [1, 2]] and the initial bids for the proportional response executions are
~b = [[0.4, 0.6], [0.9, 0.1]]. The initial fractions for tit-for-tat are given by yj,i(0) = bi,j(0)/pj(0),
where yj,i(0) is the fraction of good j that player i receives in round 0 for the bids ~b.
Note: In the figures (including Figure 5), the X axis shows the round number, while the Y axis
shows each utility ui(t) over time and each allocation over time, where an allocation means the
fraction received by each player i from good j, for each i, j, for every time unit t = 0, 1, 2,∞.
In Figure 6, we show a three player economy on which the tit-for-tat dynamic cycles. The
valuations are
a =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 6 4
3 0 9
9 6 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣
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and the initial fractions
y(0) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
0.0 0.2805339037254016 0.7194660962745985
0.273923422472049 0.0 0.726076577527951
0.491752727261851 0.5082472727381491 0.0
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(a) Allocations under tit-for-tat for T = 30 rounds. (b) Utilities under tit-for-tat for T = 30 rounds; same
initial conditions as in Figure (a)
Figure 6: Tit-for-tat dynamic cycling for both utilities and allocations with period two. The
instance is a three player economy where the matrix does not satisfy the symmetry property
under which tit-for-tat is known to converge to market equilibria [WZ07] (Recall this property
requires that there exist values wj so that ai,j = wj for each player i and good j.).
The fractions oscillate between the values at time t = 0, equal to y(0), and those from time
t = 1, which are equal to:
y(1) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
0.0 0.4552048517736218 0.5447951482263783
0.1553967077250424 0.0 0.8446032922749576
0.5978029457196989 0.402197054280301 0.0
∣∣∣∣∣∣
We note that market equilibria exist on such graphs and proportional response converges
on such instances for any non-degenerate initial bids.
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A Additional Proofs
The following theorem states that for a linear exchange market, any equilibrium allocation can
be paired with any equilibrium price to get an equilibrium pair of allocation and price.
Theorem 6. Let ~p∗ be any equilibrium price, and ~u∗ be equilibrium utilities. Let ~x be any
feasible allocation that gives equilibrium utilities to all players, i.e., ∀ i, ∑j ai,jxi,j = u∗i . Then
the pair (~x, ~p∗) is an equilibrium.
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Proof. Let ( ~x∗, ~p∗) be a pair of equilibrium allocation and price for the exchange market. Con-
sider the Fisher market with budgets Bi = p
∗
i for all i, denoted by Fisher(~p
∗).
1. Then the pair ( ~x∗, ~p∗) is also an equilibrium of this Fisher market, since the equilibrium
conditions for the exchange market directly imply the equilibrium conditions for the Fisher
market.
2. Since Fisher markets have a unique equilibrium price [EG59], this price must be ~p∗.
3. Now suppose ~x be any other allocation as in the hypothesis of the Theorem. This implies
that ~x is an optimal solution to the Eisenberg-Gale convex program corresponding to
Fisher(~p∗), and therefore (~x, ~p∗) is also an equilibrium of Fisher(~p∗).
4. This implies that (~x, ~p∗) is also an equilibrium for the exchange market. Once again, the
equilibrium conditions are essentially identical.
Theorem 7. Suppose that there is an equilibrium allocation such that the support graph on the
set of nodes is connected. Then the equilibrium prices are unique up to a scaling factor
Proof. Suppose that i and j are such that xi,j > 0. Then from the condition (1), we get that
the ratio of their equilibrium prices must equal ai,j/u
∗
i , which is independent of the choice of
the equilibrium, since equilibrium utilities are unique. Thus if the support graph is connected,
the ratio of any two equilibrium prices remains the same, which means the equilibrium prices
form a ray.
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